
Introduction to IPv6

(Chapter 4 in Huitema)

IPv6,Mobility-1

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Special IPv6 addresses

- Unspecified = 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 = ::
 - Only as source address
- Loopback = 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 = ::1
 - For sending datagrams to itself
- IPv4 addresses prepended with zeroes
 - 0:0:0:0:0:0:AABB:CCDD = ::a.b.c.d
- Site-local addresses
 - $\ FEC0:0000:0000:subnet:station$
- Link-local addresses
 - FEB0:0000:0000:station

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IPv6,Mobility-3

IPv6 header

Version=6 (4)	Traffic class (8)	Flow label (24)		
Payload length (16) N			Next header type (8)	Hop limit (8)
Source address (128)				
Destination address (128)				

• Differences between v4 and v6

- No checksum (performed at lower layers)
- No fragmentation (path MTU discovery instead, min. 1280)
- No options (linked extension headers instead)
- Extension headers replace options

IPv6 header	NH	Extension	NH	Extension	NH	Payload (TCP)
S-38.121 S-02 / N Beijar						IPv6,Mobility


IPv6 supports strict or loose source routing


• Routing header


Reserved				
IPv6 address 1				

- Only the router whose address is destination address in IPv6 header examines this extension
- Forwarder
 - Moves the next address to the IPv6 header
 - Decrements the number of segments left

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Router discovery

• For building a local list of routers on the same network

Type = 134	Code = 0		le = 0	Checksum
Cur. hop limit	Μ	0	Res.	Router lifetime
Reachable time				
Retransmission timer				
Options				

- Curr.hop limit: Suggestion for initial hop limit value
- Router lifetime: Seconds for holding in router list
- Reachable time: Expected time neighbors remain reachable after advertising the media address in milliseconds
- Reachable retransmission timer: Interfal between successive solicitations of a neighbor that is not returning solicited neighbor advertisements (ms).

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IPv6,Mobility-9


Neighbor discovery in IPv6 replaces ARP


• If there is no MAC address entry for the next hop, a neighbor solicitation message (comp. ARP-request) is sent:


Type = 135	Code = 0	Checksum		
R S O Reserved				
Solicited address				
Options				


- TTL=1, own MAC address in *source link-level address* option
- The message is sent to a *solicited node multicast address* derived from the address of the next-hop
- MAC address for the message derived from this address
- The host recognizing its address, replies with a neighbor advertisement message (comp. ARP-reply)
 - Format similar, but Type=136
 - MAC address in *link layer address* option
 - R=address is router, S=reply to solicitation, O=overides previous cache entry

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











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





<section-header> Different types of mobility Computers transported and connected from different locations Dynamic configuration => new IP address Access through modem/ISDN Access through modem/ISDN Prote connection cut off To C connection cut off Mobile computers, which stay connected during movements Radio, infrared Same IP address Mobile networks, e.g. in cars, planes, trains, ships Recursive mobility (mobile station in mobile network)








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




Registration request

- Registration request message contains
 - Message type = 1
 - Flags
 - · FA colocated with MN
 - preferred encapsulation
 - Requested lifetime
 - 0 = cancellation of previous
 - Home address of MN
 - HA address
 - COA address
 - Request identification
 - Extensions
 - E.g. authentication

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Security issues (1)

Attack types

- Someone pretends to be a FA to capture its traffic

- Someone replaying old registration messages
- Authentication extension proves the origin of the message and that the contents has not been changed
 - Security parameter index (SPI) together with HA, COA, or NM identifies security context
 - Shared secret, signature algorithm (e.g. keyed MD5) part of security context
 - Data and secret key \rightarrow authentication field
 - MN to HA authentication mandatory
 - FA to HA and MN to FA authentications optional


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
Security issues (2)
Attack types


Someone pretends to be a FA to capture its traffic
Someone replaying old registration messages


Two request must not contain the same identification


NTP timestamps (64-bit)
Only requests with higher timestamps are accepted
The timestamps must be close to the current time
Random numbers used only once















Mobile IPv6

(Chapter 13 in Huitema)

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Discovery

- The MN and FA are often colocated \Rightarrow No separate FA
- Hosts listen to router adverisements to the learn prefixes of the link
 - Hosts can detect that they are visiting a foreign network
- COA obtained with address configuration procedures
- Routers willing to act as home agents indicate it in the router advertisement

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Binding performed using destination extensions
Binding update – informs about the new COA
Binding ack – acknowledges the COA
Binding request – To request information about the current COA
Home address – Identifies the home address of the MN
Authentication with the security option

